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INTRODUCTION
Federal courts guarantee the right to a fair, but not to an error1
free, trial. When an error occurs, courts must balance the benefit of
correcting the error against the judicial system’s interests in efficiency
(including minimizing the costs of a retrial) and finality (including
2
maintaining public confidence in judicial decisions). Traditionally,
efficiency and finality have carried less weight than fairness in the
criminal context because criminal sanctions may result in imprison3
ment and greater social stigma than civil sanctions. Yet, even in criminal cases, some constitutional errors are harmless and do not justify
4
reversal of the trial outcome. The category of errors known as trial
errors can be harmless if the government can show beyond a reasona5
ble doubt that they did not contribute to the verdict. Other errors,
1

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (requiring appellate courts to disregard “[a]ny error,
defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights”).
2
See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 79, 121 (1988) (discussing the effect of reversal in terms of “the finality of the
trial outcome and . . . an added expenditure of judicial resources”); see also Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (“The harmless-error doctrine . . . promotes
public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the
trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.”).
3
See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 2, at 137 (“As our . . . commitment to the availability of habeas corpus attests, finality and efficiency concerns carry relatively less sway in
criminal cases than they do in civil cases—a product of a criminal defendant’s countervailing liberty interest.” (footnote omitted)).
4
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (holding that some constitutional errors may be “so unimportant and insignificant” that, even in a criminal case,
they are harmless and do not require “automatic reversal of the conviction”).
5
See id. at 24; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (stressing that
the test for harmlessness “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a
guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error”).
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called structural errors, are so damning to the fairness of a trial that
6
they warrant automatic reversal. Structural errors account for a small
subset of all errors, and even most constitutional errors are trial errors, subject to harmless error review.
This Comment examines the concept of structural error and the
merit of classifying one particular error—constructive amendment of
an indictment—as a structural error. Constructive amendment “occurs when either the government (usually during its presentation of
evidence and/or its argument), the court (usually through its instructions to the jury), or both, broadens the possible bases for conviction
7
beyond those presented by the grand jury.”
Supreme Court doctrine provides a reasonable foundation for
finding that constructive amendment is a structural error. Nonetheless, the Court’s understandable hesitance to expand the category of
structural errors, as well as the malleability of the structural error doctrine, makes it more likely that constructive amendment will be classified as a trial error.
In Part I, I spell out the four interpretations of Arizona v. Fulminante, the case in which the Supreme Court distinguished structural
error from trial error. I critique each interpretation’s ability to explain structural error descriptively (by articulating why the Court has
classified errors as it has) and prescriptively (by identifying the features of errors that are not conducive to harmless error analysis). I
conclude that none of the four interpretations provides an independently satisfactory account of structural error, although each interpretation identifies features that many, though not all, strucutral errors
share. In other words, each interpretation points to features that constitute a family resemblance among structural errors.
In Part II, I apply Fulminante to constructive amendment. I explore the relationship between structural error and plain error review,
and critique certain circuit courts’ treatment of constructive amendment as structural error only when the defendant preserves the objec6

See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991).
United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); accord
United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1143 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Constructive
amendment of an indictment occurs where the permissible bases for conviction are
broadened beyond those presented to the grand jury.”); United States v. Hien Van
Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 2002) (“A constructive amendment occurs when the
Government, through evidence presented at trial, or the district court, through instructions to the jury, broadens the basis for a defendant’s conviction beyond acts
charged in the indictment.”).
7
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tion at trial, not when the case arises on plain error review. After surveying the divergent approaches that the circuits apply to constructive
amendment on plain error review, I apply Fulminante’s four interpretations and find that constructive amendment resembles identified
structural errors in numerous ways. I conclude, however, that despite
a pre-Fulminante Supreme Court holding giving constructive amend8
ment a status that seems structural under the Fulminante framework,
today’s Supreme Court is unlikely to classify constructive amendment
as structural error because of the Court’s reluctance to expand that
category of error. Assuming that courts will continue to treat constructive amendment as a trial error, I therefore propose that courts
considering constructive amendment on plain error review employ a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice when the burden of proving the
content of jury deliberations would otherwise rest with the defendant.
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TRIAL AND STRUCTURAL ERRORS
The Supreme Court has recognized a narrow set of rights that, if
9
denied, are structural errors: the rights to counsel and to counsel of
10
11
choice, the right of self-representation, the right to an impartial
12
13
judge, freedom from racial discrimination in grand jury selection,
14
the right to a public trial, and the right to accurate reasonable-doubt
15
16
jury instructions. By contrast, the list of trial errors is extensive.
8

See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (explaining the decision in Stirone v.
United States, in which the Court deemed constructive amendment a violation of a “substantial right”).
9
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (reversing a felony conviction of a defendant who lacked counsel without analyzing the prejudice that the deprivation caused).
10
See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (deeming deprivation of counsel of choice a structural error).
11
See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (finding harmless error
analysis inapplicable to deprivation of the right to self-representation because exercising the right increases the chance of a guilty verdict).
12
See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534 (1927) (holding that trial before a biased
judge “necessarily involves a lack of due process”).
13
See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (presuming prejudice where
discriminatory grand jury selection undermined “the objectivity of those charged with
bringing a defendant to judgment”).
14
See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984) (“[T]he defendant should not be
required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee.”).
15
See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) (finding that, because of an
inadequate reasonable-doubt instruction, no actual jury verdict had been rendered
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While the list of structural errors has remained consistent, the Supreme Court’s methods of distinguishing between trial and structural
error have fluctuated.
A. Four Readings of Fulminante
In Fulminante, the Supreme Court provided a theoretical explanation for the dichotomy between the trial errors and structural errors
that it had identified in prior cases. The closely divided Court then
held that the admission of a coerced confession was a trial error, sub17
jecting it to harmless error analysis. The majority used three different descriptions of the structural error category, and subsequent opinions reveal a fourth possible reading of Fulminante’s characterization
of structural error. In this Section, I explain these four readings and
address the conceptual weaknesses of each. I conclude that no single
reading provides a satisfactory explanation of structural error.
1. The Framework Approach
One characterization of structural error in Fulminante focused on
“structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism,” which
the Court also described as “structural defect[s] affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in
18
the trial process itself.” The policy underlying this “framework approach” is sensible: the parties need not debate whether the error affected the outcome, because the defect permeated the trial structure
itself. Because trial structure dictates trial outcome, judges can fairly
presume that the error affected substantial rights.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the framework approach has two major problems. First, the framework approach cannot explain why er-

and the court could thus not apply harmless error analysis to determine whether the
error affected the verdict).
16
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1991) (declaring that “most
constitutional errors can be harmless” and naming sixteen examples of trial error).
17
See id. at 310 (explaining that the admission of a coerced confession is similar to
other constitutional violations that the Court had previously classified as trial errors).
18
Id. at 309-10. Of the varied definitions in Fulminante, the framework approach
seems most faithful to the Court’s prior decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
22 (1967), where it said that some constitutional errors may not require reversal if they
are “unimportant and insignificant.” See David McCord, The “Trial”/“Structural” Error
Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1415-16 (1997) (describing the framework approach as a revival of Chapman).
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rors that are similar in their relation to the trial framework are classified differently. For example, Fulminante cited a case in which the
“denial of a defendant’s right to be present at trial” was classified as a
19
trial error. Admittedly, a defendant’s absence from trial may not affect the substance of proceedings like the denial of counsel would, so
this simple distinction may explain why the former is a trial error
while the latter is a structural error.
The defendant’s absence, however, is part of the broader framework of who may be present at the trial. Characterized in this way, the
right to be present at trial is analogous to the denial of a public trial,
20
which the Supreme Court has deemed structural. If any difference
exists, the defendant’s presence seems more basic to the trial framework in an adversarial system than does the presence of nonparty observers. Given the similarity of those two errors in terms of the
framework of a trial and the trial’s audience, the framework approach
cannot explain the divergence in outcomes between cases involving
these errors. Even though the right to be present as a defendant is
less central to the trial framework than the right to an attorney, it is
not less central to the trial framework than the right to a public trial.
Second, there does not seem to be a principled distinction between a procedural right and a component of the trial framework.
The Court treats structural and trial errors as conceptually separate
categories by drawing a bright-line distinction in their treatment on
review: structural errors generate automatic reversal, while trial errors
do not. The framework approach, however, provides only differences
21
of degree between the two types of error. It is challenging to find a
bright-line distinction in Fulminante because the case does not explain
when an error that is procedural in nature becomes a part of the trial
framework. Virtually any procedural right—and the Constitution affords many—can be described as affecting the framework of a trial,
because procedure is the primary ingredient of the framework. One
way to resolve the ambiguity is to conclude that all procedural errors
are structural errors. Such a conclusion, though, contradicts the

19

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307 (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18 & n.2
(1983) (per curiam)).
20
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
21
Cf. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless
Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 162-63 (1991) (arguing that the distinction between trial and structural errors, as the Fulminante Court explained them, is
one of degree).
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Court’s statement in Fulminante that “most constitutional errors can be
22
harmless.” Because most constitutional errors do not justify automatic reversal, a theory of structural error must distinguish between procedural rights that merit automatic reversal and those that do not.
The framework approach does not do so. Consequently, the framework approach is an inadequate means of separating errors into distinct categories for the purpose of appellate review.
Together, these arguments demonstrate the inadequacies of the
framework approach both as a historical explanation of the Court’s
decisions and as a theoretical tool for deciding future cases.
2. The Evidentiary Approach
The Fulminante Court observed that, unlike a structural error, a
trial error may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was
23
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” A reviewing court can weigh
the import of a trial error against the other evidence that was introduced at trial to determine the effect that the error had on the proceedings and whether the error was harmless. For example, while an
appellate court can weigh the effect of a wrongly introduced piece of
evidence against the other evidence to determine its overall impact,
an incorrect jury instruction or the denial of counsel of choice is more
difficult to compare. Motivating this “evidentiary approach” is an appealing proposition: if a court cannot quantitatively assess the effect
of an error, then the specific factual situation in which the error occurs should be irrelevant. Consequently, the evidentiary character of
the error ought to determine whether the court should reverse a conviction. In addition, the inability to weigh the evidence means that
the parties would have nothing to argue on appeal to establish or dispute the prejudice that an error caused. The explanation is closely
related to the basic justification for structural errors: they require automatic reversal in part because their consequences are difficult to assess. It also accounts for the many violations relating to erroneous ad24
mission or exclusion of evidence that the Court has called trial errors.
22

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306.
Id. at 307-08.
24
See id. at 306-07 (reciting Supreme Court jurisprudence considering trial errors
as, among others, the “erroneous exclusion of defendant’s testimony regarding the
circumstances of his confession,” the “admission of identification evidence” or “the
out-of-court statement of a nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth
23
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Classifying all weighable errors as trial errors, however, makes the
category of structural errors too narrow. Even some structural errors
are amenable to quantitative assessment on occasion. For example, a
court could quantitatively assess the amount of harm in a case involving a prejudiced judge if the prejudice were isolated to a distinct action and the prosecution presented other substantial evidence of
guilt. Similarly, the error of denying representation to an attorneydefendant could be quantified on review using ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrine. Because these errors do not always evade quantitative assessment, the evidentiary approach dictates that they are trial
25
The Supreme Court, however, has identified prejudiced
errors.
26
judges and denial of counsel as archetypes of structural error. Therefore, despite its conceptual appeal, the evidentiary approach cannot
explain why the Supreme Court has found some errors to be structural.
3. The Timing Approach
The Fulminante majority claimed that the previously recognized
trial errors “occurred during the presentation of the case to the
27
jury.” This “timing approach” designates more errors as trial errors
than the evidentiary approach does because voir dire, opening and
closing statements, and jury instructions involve the presentation of
28
the case to the jury but not the introduction of evidence. The appeal
of this approach rests in its simplicity, as well as in its recognition of
the distinction between factual issues that are within the domain of
the jury and procedural decisions that are more fundamental to the
structure of a trial.
Nonetheless, the timing approach is the weakest of the four approaches. Its most substantial doctrinal difficulty is its inability to explain why certain jury instructions are categorized as trial errors while
Amendment Confrontation Clause,” the admission of a “confession obtained in violation of Massiah v. United States,” and the “admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment” (citations omitted)).
25
See Ogletree, supra note 21, at 165 (“[M]ost constitutional errors can be
weighed meaningfully against the total evidence . . . . [O]ne can only wonder whether
it is only a matter of time before the Chief Justice’s two paradigmatic ‘structural errors’—biased judges and lack of counsel—are subjected to the harmless error rule.”).
26
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), for the right to counsel and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 410
(1927), for the right to an impartial judge, and counting both as structural).
27
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307.
28
McCord, supra note 18, at 1414.
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29

others are categorized as structural errors. Fulminante cited numer30
ous cases in which erroneous jury instructions were trial errors, for
example, but two years later, the Court held in Sullivan v. Louisiana
that a defective reasonable-doubt jury instruction was a structural er31
ror. The dissenting opinion in Fulminante recognized that this in32
consistency existed even at the time that Fulminante was decided. Despite the difference in their importance to the trial, defective
reasonable-doubt instructions occur at the same point in a trial as
other erroneous instructions, so a timing approach cannot explain the
difference in outcome.
In addition, the timing approach shows most clearly how the trial/structural error dichotomy serves as a poor proxy for the seriousness of an error. In this context, seriousness relates to the gravity of
the error and to the value of the right infringed, independent of the
importance of the right for ensuring accuracy. Many errors that occur
outside the presentation of the case to a jury can be minor, and dubbing each one structural would create a flood of reversals that would
33
strain the court system. At the same time, errors made during the
presentation to the jury can be serious. Thus, there is no intrinsic relation between timing and the seriousness of an error.
Many authors have criticized Fulminante (and harmless error analysis generally) for the mismatch between errors that are structural and
errors that are serious: they claim that Fulminante and its progeny collapse the value of rights into a question of accuracy, excluding other
34
values by which an error might be considered serious. Even if the
29

See id. at 1427 (recognizing that “the viability of the durational definition” is
“seriously undermined” insofar as “jury instructions are clearly within the durational
parameter”).
30
See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306-07 (identifying numerous examples, including
jury instructions that were overbroad at sentencing, that allowed for an erroneous conclusive presumption, that provided for an erroneous rebuttable presumption, that
failed to instruct on the presumption of innocence, and that misstated an element of
the offense).
31
508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).
32
See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 291 (White, J., dissenting) (observing the conflict between treating failure to instruct the jury on presumption of innocence as a trial error
while treating failure to instruct on the reasonable-doubt standard as a structural error).
33
See McCord, supra note 18, at 1415 (“[T]o define all errors that occur outside the
durational definition’s boundaries as reversible per se would expand that category, contrary to the Court’s prevailing philosophy of treating almost all error as harmless . . . .”).
34
See Linda E. Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine
Misunderstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REV. 125, 139 (1993) (explaining how, when
applying the harmless error doctrine, the Supreme Court “equat[es] a ‘fair’ trial with
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authors are correct in their descriptive claim, it is an open question
whether the lack of correlation between the trial/structural error dichotomy and seriousness is problematic.
The authors’ criticism requires two assumptions. First, all errors
past some threshold of seriousness must warrant reversal, even when
they have no effect on the reliability of a proceeding. Justifying this
assumption requires answering the most basic question about reversal:
when should fairness or other procedural values trump efficiency and
finality? While the critics may be right that the Court has removed
procedural values from the plain and harmless error doctrines, the
degree to which this is problematic is not obvious without answering
the more basic question.
Second, structural error must be the appropriate category by
which to achieve the result of automatic reversal. This assumption is
simpler, although Justice Alito has questioned whether structural and
trial error, considered together, constitute an exhaustive catalog of er35
rors and distinct categories. If other categories of error can be exempt from harmless error analysis, then classifying serious errors as
structural errors is unnecessary to achieve the result of automatic reversal. Doing so, moreover, sacrifices conceptual clarity to the extent

one that correctly determines guilt or innocence” to the exclusion of valuing a procedure or right as an end in itself); Ogletree, supra note 21, at 162, 169-71 (arguing that
the Fulminante distinction “fail[s] by virtue of its insufficient recognition of other values in our criminal justice system,” such as the value of public respect for the legal system and restraining government from abusing human rights); Stacy & Dayton, supra
note 2, at 88-89 (“The Court’s theory of harmless error . . . is predicated on a conception of a fair trial that incorporates only the value of factual accuracy.”); Steven M.
Shepard, Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J.
1180, 1207-08 (2008) (explaining the structural rights to a public trial, racially unbiased grand jury selection, and self-representation as based on the grounds of transparency, antidiscrimination, and autonomy, respectively, rather than on accuracy).
But see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (asserting that structural errors are
“so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal (i.e., [they] ‘affect substantial
rights’) without regard to their effect on the outcome”).
35
See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 159 (2006) (Alito, J., dissenting) (interpreting Fulminante as describing “two poles of constitutional error” and as
muddying any clear delineation between or exclusivity of the categories, although emphasizing the need to use automatic reversal cautiously). The majority of the current
Court does not share Justice Alito’s view. See id. at 149 n.4 (majority opinion) (observing that “it is hard to read [Fulminante] as doing anything other than dividing constitutional error into two comprehensive categories”).
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that a primary characteristic of a structural error is the difficulty of de36
termining the effect of the error.
Regardless of the resolution of the debate about the connection
between an error’s seriousness and its categorization as structural, the
jury-instructions objection reveals that the timing approach is an inadequate method for generalizing about the features of structural error.
4. The Reliability Approach
In Neder v. United States, the Supreme Court described structural
errors as those that “necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally
37
unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”
Similarly, in Sullivan, the Court characterized structural error as the
violation of “a ‘basic protectio[n]’ . . . without which a criminal trial
38
cannot reliably serve its function.” This “reliability approach” is not
39
explicitly mentioned in Fulminante, and it can be viewed as a fourth
approach, distinct from the three described in that case. Alternatively,
because the Court mentioned basic protections and fundamental unfairness, the reliability approach can be read as a refinement of the framework approach, where “framework” encapsulates what is basic or fundamental to a trial. Thus, a combined framework-reliability approach
would classify an error as structural if it affected the framework of a
proceeding in a way that necessarily rendered its outcome unreliable.
The reliability approach clarifies some aspects of the framework
approach, but it does so at the cost of making the theory of structural
error too narrow. The emphasis on reliability explains why denying a
defendant’s right to be present at her trial is a trial error (because the
denial does not affect substantive attributes such as the jury’s delibera40
tion and verdict), while denying the defendant’s right to counsel is a
structural error (because the lack of an attorney negatively impacts
41
the adversarial system responsible for producing reliable outcomes).
36

See infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing whether structural errors
are important errors or errors with unclear effects).
37
527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999).
38
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
39
See Shepard, supra note 34, at 1206 (identifying the Court’s fourth test for structural error).
40
See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 n.2 (1983) (per curiam) (“[T]he right to be
present during all critical stages of the proceedings and the right to be represented by
counsel, . . . [like] most constitutional rights, are subject to harmless-error analysis . . . .”).
41
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337, 345 (1963).
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The reliability approach also has the benefit of clarifying which rights
are so essential to a trial that they constitute its framework: those
rights that necessarily affect reliability.
However, very few errors necessarily render a trial unreliable. Even
the most egregious of the traditionally structural errors, such as the
refusal to appoint counsel, might not undermine the reliability of the
outcome, depending on the facts of the case and the qualifications of
the defendant who is forced to represent herself. In this respect, the
reliability approach renders the framework approach too narrow to
explain why the Court classified such errors as structural.
B. The Aftermath: Confusion About the Four Approaches
Since Fulminante, the Supreme Court has equivocated among the
various approaches to structural error. In 1993, the Court issued a
pair of decisions that shed light on the trial/structural error dichotomy. Sullivan v. Louisiana, which held that a constitutionally deficient
reasonable-doubt instruction cannot be a harmless error, mentioned
42
the timing, evidentiary, and reliability approaches. Brecht v. Abrahamson, which held that using post–Miranda warning silence to impeach a
defendant is a trial error, referred to the timing, evidentiary, and
43
framework approaches. Notably, Brecht situated trial and structural er44
rors on a “spectrum of constitutional errors,” lending credence to the
view that there is no bright-line distinction between the categories.
Subsequently, in Neder v. United States, the Court held that omitting an undisputed element of an offense from jury instructions was a
45
trial error. The Court employed the framework and reliability approaches, noting that trial errors “do[] not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair,” but omitted evidentiary and timing
46
concerns. The Court also short-circuited what otherwise might have
been an expansive definition of structural error. It abandoned as inconsistent with prior precedent the broad language in Sullivan that
said, “[T]he question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-areasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional
error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon
42
43
44
45
46

508 U.S. at 280-81.
507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993).
Id. at 629.
527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999).
Id. at 8-12.
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47

which . . . harmless-error scrutiny can operate.” While omitting an
element of an offense from jury instructions removes the complete
jury verdict upon which harmless error operates, the error does not
48
“vitiate[] all the jury’s findings,” so it is not structural.
More recently, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Court recog49
nized the denial of counsel of choice as a structural error. Applying
the framework, evidentiary, and timing approaches, the Court ignored
reliability and, in response to the dissent’s prominent use of that approach, stated that the dissent’s “single, inflexible criterion . . . that
only those errors that always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and unreliable are structural” was an inaccurate reading of
50
precedent. The Court noted that “‘fundamental unfairness’ . . . has
not been the only criterion [for structural error]” and offered the irre51
levance of harmlessness as another criterion. The latter criterion did
not factor into the decision, however. The majority instead emphasized
the “difficulty of assessing” the impact of the denial of counsel of choice
52
because of its “unquantifiable and indeterminate” consequences.
C. Alternatives: Reconciling the Four Approaches
The relationship among the approaches remains unclear, and the
more recent cases demonstrate the Supreme Court’s continuing
struggle to resolve the issue. The Court’s fluid discussion of the three
approaches in Fulminante, plus the Court’s supposed summary of Fulminante in putting forth the reliability approach, suggests that the
Court intended its various descriptions to define the same, unitary
53
concept. Using the approaches in tandem, however, generates contradictory results. Treating each as sufficient but not necessary leaves
the Court with a test that is too broad for the same reasons that each
individual approach can be overbroad. Similarly, the tests cannot be
47

Id. at 11 (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280).
Id. (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281).
49
548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
50
Id. at 149 n.4 (emphasis omitted).
51
Id. The Court described a prior case in which it held the denial of the right to
self-representation subject to automatic reversal because the right increases the risk of
a guilty verdict. Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984)). The
framework approach would also consider this error to be structural because it fundamentally alters the framework of who is present at a trial. See supra subsection I.A.1.
52
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4, 150.
53
See McCord, supra note 18, at 1412 (arguing that the majority intended its three
interpretations to be a unitary definition).
48
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necessary but insufficient, because some of the approaches are too
narrow. While it did not mention these concerns, the Court acknowledged in Gonzalez-Lopez that it had emphasized different approaches in
54
different cases, based on the facts of the cases. While the Court’s
depiction is an accurate statement of its past practices, it gives the impression that the decision about which approach to employ is unprincipled and, therefore, unpredictable and manipulable.
Short of overruling Fulminante, the best way to reconcile the approaches is to view each one as isolating a cluster of recurring features—family resemblances—that some but not all structural errors
55
share. For example, an error that affects the framework of the trial
and that occurs outside presentation to the jury might be structural,
while another error that meets neither of those criteria could nevertheless be structural if it satisfies one or two of the other approaches.
While no one feature unites all structural errors, the four approaches
carve out a paradigmatic case and identify strands of similarity within
the set of structural errors. This interpretation explains the coexistence of four approaches that can produce contrary results.
Justice Alito adopted an analogous strategy in his dissent in Gonzalez-Lopez, where he called the two types of errors “poles” on a continuum
and described “[t]he touchstone of structural error [as] fundamental
56
unfairness and unreliability,” elsewhere characterized as “the difficulty
57
of assessing the effect of the error.” While Justice Alito’s characterization of the “poles” invokes a sliding scale between structural and trial
58
errors that the other Justices seem to reject, a family-resemblance relationship is consistent with a categorical divide between structural and
trial errors. Even though the category of structural error may lack the
necessary and sufficient conditions that typically accompany definitions,
an error is still determinably structural or trial, with no middle ground.
The dichotomy matches the bright-line distinction between the treatment of structural and trial errors on review.

54

See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 149 n.4 (declining to employ “fundamental unfairness,” even though it “was the determining factor” in Neder, because it “has not
been the only criterion” that the Court has used).
55
See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-67
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968) (1958) (introducing the idea of family resemblance in the context of the meaning of language).
56
548 U.S. at 159 (Alito, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 149 n.4 (majority opinion).
58
See supra note 35.
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Unfortunately, a family-resemblance relationship between the approaches cannot satisfy the need to supply lower courts with clear
tests. A lower court will face a wide variety of errors that match at least
one, but not all, of the Fulminante approaches, and if a structural error
need not possess a set number of the features, the court is left with an
unguided choice about whether a particular error is structural. The
elasticity of family resemblance might permit either classification.
Without a theory for what errors have a sufficient number of features
to be classified as structural, the explanation of structural error is
wanting, and results will be unpredictable and inconsistent. Furthermore, the approaches may vary in importance based on context, but
Fulminante does not specify which contexts bring which approaches
into the fore. Where the factors point in opposing directions, Fulmi59
nante and its progeny provide no guidance.
On the other hand, this level of ambiguity may be acceptable.
Courts, including the Supreme Court, tolerate multifactor balancing
tests and ambiguous rules when necessary and sufficient conditions
are impractical. For example, the Polaroid test for trademark in60
fringement uses eight factors, none of which is required, while the
Mathews v. Eldridge test for due process requires examination of three
61
factors with no indication of their weight. Determining whether a
particular error bears a family resemblance to an established category
of structural error is not more difficult than the question of how many
Polaroid factors must be met or how to weigh the Mathews factors. In
addition, the Court has provided more guidance for the identification
of structural error than it has for some other open-ended standards.
Consider the totality of the circumstances test used to adjudge proba62
ble cause, or the reasonable person standard for determining wheth-

59

See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 972-81 (1987) (describing problems with implementing balancing tests).
60
See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (describing the claim’s success as the “function of many variables” and including a nonexclusive list of eight).
61
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (requiring courts to consider
the plaintiff’s interest; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest, as well as
the increased accuracy that the proposed safeguards would provide; and the government’s interest, including the costs of those safeguards); see also Aleinikoff, supra note
59, at 982-83 (discussing the Court’s application of the Mathews test).
62
See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (acknowledging
the inability to articulate with precision, much less reduce to legal rules, the meaning
of probable cause and reasonable suspicion because “[t]hey are commonsense, non-
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63

er a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes. These tests do not
provide any factors, and yet the Court finds them adequately clear for
lower courts to apply. In comparison, even when read as establishing
a family-resemblance test, Fulminante dictates the factors that a court
64
Thus, while not a model of clarity, a familyshould consider.
resemblance test may provide adequate guidance.
A family-resemblance test gets at the problem of structural error
better than the other approaches, which do not map onto the concept
of structural error with any accuracy. The Court’s current method is
less desirable because it purports to follow distinctions like timing,
which, in reality, do not guide the Court’s decisions. Until the Court
reconciles the approaches or declares which are more decisive, a family-resemblance relationship seems to be the most plausible account of
the persistence of divergent approaches. Errors that satisfy all four
approaches are the most likely to be considered structural, but an error can still be structural even if it satisfies only one of the approaches.
II. CASE STUDY: CONSTRUCTIVE AMENDMENT
To better understand the Fulminante approaches, this Part considers
their application to the particular error of constructive amendment.
First, I explain what counts as a constructive amendment and what
makes the error troubling. Second, I critique the circuit courts’ treatment of constructive amendment, which differs according to whether
or not plain error review applies. Third, I survey the ways that circuit
courts have dealt with constructive amendment within the trial/structural error dichotomy when the issue arises on plain error review. While most circuits have considered the problem, few appreciate
the various readings of Fulminante and all the aspects of the trial/structural error distinction. Fourth, I analyze constructive amendment under each of the Fulminante approaches. I conclude that constructive amendment displays many features that the Fulminante
approaches identify as demarcating structural errors but that the Supreme Court’s understandable hesitance to expand the category
technical conceptions that deal with . . . factual and practical considerations” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
63
See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (stating the reasonable person test).
64
Cf. Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 28 (2000) (classifying multifactor balancing tests as standards but
acknowledging that they are “more rule-like than requirements of ‘reasonableness’”).
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makes it unlikely that the Court will deem constructive amendment
structural. The malleability of the purportedly unitary Fulminante test
gives the Court the leeway to hold that constructive amendment is only a trial error. Finally, I argue that courts should strike a balance between placing the burden on the defendant and deeming constructive
amendment a structural error. I propose that courts employ a rebuttable presumption that constructive amendment affects substantial rights.
A. The Problem of Constructive Amendment
An indictment is constructively amended when a prosecutor or
judge broadens the possible grounds for conviction beyond what the
indictment specified. For example, one court found a constructive
amendment when a defendant was charged with possession of cocaine
and methamphetamine but the government presented evidence about
possession of marijuana and the judge instructed the jury that it could
convict on the basis that the defendant possessed any controlled sub65
Even though the statute under which the defendant was
stance.
charged could apply to any controlled substance, the charges them66
The marijuana evidence and
selves did not include marijuana.
judge’s instructions thus broadened the basis for conviction beyond
what the indictment stated. Similarly, courts have found constructive
amendment when jury instructions expanded the basis for conviction
67
from resisting arrest by means of a firearm to resisting arrest generally,
and when an indictment charged the defendant with misbranding
drugs by repackaging them while the government’s evidence spoke to
68
misbranding drugs by virtue of not keeping them sterile.
Courts have not adopted a uniform definition of constructive
amendment. Some courts impose a heightened requirement that
there be a “substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been
convicted of an offense other than the one charged by the grand
69
jury.” Under this test, the mere fact that the court or prosecutor
broadened the basis for conviction is insufficient; a defendant is also
65

United States v. Wozniak, 126 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 109-10.
67
United States v. Nuñez, 180 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1999).
68
United States v. Milstein, 401 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
69
Wozniak, 126 F.3d at 109 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); accord United
States v. Johnston, 353 F.3d 617, 623-24 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); United States v.
Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 757 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Moore, 198 F.3d 793, 796
(10th Cir. 1999).
66
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required to show that she suffered a substantial likelihood of being
convicted for a different offense due to the error. The arguments in
this Comment are equally applicable to cases falling under that heightened “substantial likelihood” definition.
Other jurisdictions define constructive amendment liberally, as
any alteration that results in a conviction for an action not included in
the indictment, including a narrowing of the possible basis for convic70
tion. The underlying concerns about a broadened basis for conviction are distinct and more troubling than those for a narrowed basis
71
of conviction. This Comment therefore excludes from consideration
the set of cases where a constructive amendment narrowed the possible basis of conviction.
A constructive amendment is distinct from—and more severe
than—a variance, in which “the circumstances alleged in the indictment to have formed the context of the defendant’s actions differ in
some way nonessential to the conclusion that the crime must have
72
been committed.”
In other words, a constructive amendment
changes the charges, while a variance changes the method of proving
the charges.
Constructive amendment undermines two constitutional rights.
First, it violates the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. When
an indictment is constructively amended, a defendant can be convicted of charges that were not presented to a grand jury, thereby con73
travening the Fifth Amendment. Without a grand jury, “prosecution
beg[ins] by arms of the Government without the consent of fellow cit-

70

See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 670 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(defining constructive amendment as “presentation of evidence or . . . actions of the
court” that generate “a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
71
See infra text accompanying note 75 (describing the issue of notice, which is of
concern only when the basis for conviction is broadened).
72
United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 709 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); cf. Thomas,
274 F.3d at 670 (describing a variance as occurring “when the charging terms of the
indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially
different from those alleged in the indictment,” yet failing to mention the inessential
nature of the changes (quoting United States v. Frank, 156 F.3d 332, 337 n.5 (2d Cir.
1998) (per curiam))).
73
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring the indictment of a grand jury for a felony
conviction). The Grand Jury Clause has not been incorporated against the states. See
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884); Wilson v. Lindler, 8 F.3d 173, 174
(4th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’g 995 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993).
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74

izens.” Even though a jury of one’s peers ultimately convicts the defendant whether or not a grand jury exists, the absence of the prior
procedural check removes the layer of protection that the Grand Jury
Clause seeks to provide. Second, constructive amendment is inconsistent with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the
75
nature and cause of the accusation.” An indictment gives defendants
notice of the charges against them, but a defendant is not on notice of
constructive changes, which undermines the defendant’s ability to
prepare an adequate defense.
In addition, constructive amendment opens the door for two other potential problems. First, constructive amendment makes defendants vulnerable to repeat prosecutions for the same offense. If a defendant is convicted of a crime that was not mentioned in her
indictment, a later grand jury might indict the defendant for the very
76
same crime. Second, ambiguity about the source of a conviction generates a similar problem for appeals. As the Supreme Court has observed, a mismatch between indictment and conviction “enables [the]
conviction to rest on one point and the affirmance of the conviction
to rest on another. It gives the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill
77
in the gaps of proof by surmise or conjecture.” The ambiguity about
what facts served as the basis for conviction gives the government leeway to change explanations after conviction and thereby disable the
defendant’s attempted appeal.

74

Thomas, 274 F.3d at 670; see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (describing the grand jury as “standing between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating
power or by malice and personal ill will”).
75
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76
See United States v. Folks, 236 F.3d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that one
function of the Grand Jury Clause is “to insure that the defendant is not subject to a
second prosecution” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Vavlitis, 9
F.3d 206, 210 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that “[m]idtrial amendments are deemed prejudicial” partly in order “to prevent reprosecution for the same offense”). While vulnerability to repeat prosecutions is not a constitutional problem, an actual repeat prosecution would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb . . . .”).
77
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 766 (1962).
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B. Preserved Objections and Plain Error Review
78

Preserved structural errors merit automatic reversal. When a defendant fails to preserve error via a proper objection, appellate courts
employ a plain error standard for review. Notably, the additional requirements of plainness and discretionary judgment prevent courts
79
from using automatic reversal on plain error review. However, if an
error is structural, then the “affects substantial rights” prong of plain
error review should be presumptively satisfied. Because circuit courts
already recognize that constructive amendment is a structural error
when the error is preserved, they should also recognize that the error
affects substantial rights on plain error review. This Section explores
the relationship between structural error and plain error review.
On review of a preserved objection to constructive amendment,
the Supreme Court has held that constructive amendment should result in automatic reversal without regard to harmless error analysis. In
Stirone v. United States, decided thirty-one years prior to Fulminante, the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the indictment charged
the defendant with obstructing shipments of sand to Pennsylvania but
the prosecutor argued that the defendant obstructed shipments of
80
steel from Pennsylvania. The Court asserted that the error was “far
too serious to be . . . dismissed as harmless error” and described the
81
right to a grand jury judgment as a “substantial right.” Because the
burden of persuading a court that a constitutional error was harmless
rests with the government, the modern effect of Stirone is to make the
presumption of prejudice unrebuttable.
78

See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (listing errors that “will always
invalidate the conviction”).
79
Cf. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n.14 (1985) (deeming a per se approach to plain error review, based on the satisfaction of the plainness prong alone, to
be “flawed” because plain error review has multiple requirements).
80
361 U.S. 212, 213-15 (1960). There is some dispute about whether Stirone was a
case of constructive amendment at all, and it may be better explained as a variance. See
United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 61 n.11 (1st Cir. 2008) (acknowledging the government’s argument that Stirone involved a variance but declining to address it). If Stirone did involve a variance, the fact that the Supreme Court found it not subject to
harmless error review makes it more likely that the Court would find constructive
amendment a structural error, because the concerns involved with constructive amendment are more severe. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (explaining concerns such as notice and repeat prosecution, and suggesting that they are less relevant in
the variance context, when the indictment and its amendment vary only in method of
proof and not in an ultimate legal conclusion).
81
Stirone, 361 U.S. at 217, 219.
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However, when the Supreme Court lists past examples of structur82
al error, it never includes Stirone. One possible explanation is that,
because the case was pre-Chapman, the Court was reluctant to find any
constitutional errors harmless. Under this theory, constructive
amendment might receive different treatment if it were considered
today. The Supreme Court made a similar observation in Hedgpeth v.
Pulido, where it discredited reliance on two pre-Chapman cases as the
basis for thinking that an instructional error may have been structur83
al. Nevertheless, in cases of direct review from a preserved error, the
twelve circuit courts that have considered the issue continue to apply
84
Stirone to deem constructive amendment a structural error.
On plain error review, when a defendant has failed to object to
85
constructive amendment, Stirone does not control. Automatic reversal is not appropriate because the defendant must prove the addition86
al requirements of plain error. In fact, when the error is not preserved, the circuits are split on whether constructive amendment is
(1) structural error, (2) trial error that is per se prejudicial, (3) trial
error that is presumptively prejudicial but subject to rebuttal, or (4)
simply trial error. The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide
whether constructive amendment is presumptively prejudicial or
87
whether it is an instance of structural error. However, if the concerns about notice and grand jury approval justify treating constructive
amendment as a structural error on harmless error review, then courts

82

See United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Notably
absent from [Fulminante’s] list of structural defects is the type of defective indictment
at issue in Stirone . . . .”); United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 713 n.17 (4th Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (observing that, in the cases about errors not subject to harmless error review, the Court has not mentioned Stirone).
83
129 S. Ct. 530, 532 (2008) (per curiam).
84
See Floresca, 38 F.3d at 711 & n.12, 712 (collecting cases that demonstrate consensus and reaching the same result, thereby making it “unanimous among the circuits” that constructive amendment is conclusively presumed to be prejudicial if it is
properly preserved).
85
See United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that Stirone
did not involve plain error review and that “the difference between harmless error and
plain error review is a meaningful one”).
86
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
87
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33 (2002) (“[W]e need not resolve
whether respondents satisfy [the third] element of the plain-error inquiry, because
even assuming respondents’ substantial rights were affected, the error [of constructive
amendment] did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”).
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on plain error review should consider the prejudice prong of United
88
States v. Olano presumptively satisfied, easing the defendant’s burden.
According to Olano, the definition of plain error is (1) an error
89
that (2) is plain and (3) affects substantial rights. If all three requirements are satisfied, then the reviewing court (4) may judge
whether the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings” such that the court should exer90
cise discretion to correct the error. Plain error review is stricter than
harmless error review because of the addition of the plainness prong
and discretionary judgment and because, unlike in harmless error
91
cases, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion.
Despite these differences, the analysis used in the Fulminante elaboration of structural errors can inform the assessment of what affects
substantial rights under the third prong of Olano’s plain error review.
This approach is sensible because the statutory source of harmless error analysis maps onto the statutory source of plain error review. The
notion of harmless error that Fulminante explicates has its origins in
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), which states that harmless
92
error is an error that does not “affect substantial rights.” Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), addressing plain error, also refers
to “substantial rights.” The key nuance is that the phrase serves a different function in each subsection: Rule 52(a) bars error correction if
the error does not affect substantial rights, whereas Rule 52(b) permits
93
error correction only if the error does affect substantial rights. This
difference is the basis for the distinct burdens of persuasion based on
whether or not a defendant preserved an objection. Structural error,
however, functions as a decisive finding that renders burdens of persuasion moot. Thus, the case law about what constitutes a structural

88

507 U.S. 725 (1993).
Id. at 735.
90
Id. at 736 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S.
157, 160 (1936)).
91
See United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2007) (articulating the differences in purpose and application between harmless error and plain error).
92
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
93
See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (“When the defendant has made a timely objection to
an error and Rule 52(a) applies, a court of appeals normally engages in a specific analysis of the district court record—a so-called ‘harmless error’ inquiry—to determine
whether the error was prejudicial. Rule 52(b) normally requires the same kind of inquiry, with one important difference: It is the defendant rather than the Government
who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.”).
89
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error should be useful for determining whether an error affects substantial rights under the third prong of plain error review.
This approach is also conceptually coherent. Structural error
guarantees reversal when it is difficult or impossible to isolate an error’s prejudicial effect because the error undercuts the reliability of
94
the judicial proceeding. Similarly, when a court conducts plain error
review and an error has the features of a structural error, it is difficult
or impossible to demonstrate prejudice.
The Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held that structural
95
errors by their nature satisfy the third Olano prong. Other courts
have engaged in substantially similar analyses. For example, the First
Circuit has held that it “need not consider the strength of the [remaining] evidence” to conclude that a structural error to which the
defendant did not object affected substantial rights and thus satisfied
96
the third Olano prong. Although the Supreme Court has not de97
cided the issue, it acknowledged some relationship between structur98
al errors and the third Olano prong in Johnson v. United States. The
Court assumed ad arguendo that “failure to submit materiality to the
jury” satisfied the third Olano prong but found for the government on
99
the fourth prong. The “affecting substantial rights” discussion operated on the assumption that, if the error were structural, then it af100
fected substantial rights.

94

See United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 309 (1st Cir. 2000) (“These
‘structural errors’ require that convictions . . . be set aside without any examination of
prejudice because, among other things, it would be well-nigh impossible to determine
the amount of harm.”). But see infra note 114 (acknowledging ambiguity over the purpose of addressing structural error).
95
See United States v. Recio, 371 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] finding of
structural error satisfies the third prong of the Olano test.”); United States v. Adams,
252 F.3d 276, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the presence of a structural error exempts the appellant from needing to prove prejudice); United States v. David, 83 F.3d
638, 647 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a structural error “satisfies Olano’s third prong”
without additional analysis).
96
United States v. Colon-Pagan, 1 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 1993).
97
See United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has never specifically resolved the more sophisticated question of whether a structural error necessarily affects substantial rights . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
98
520 U.S. 461 (1997).
99
Id. at 469-70.
100
See id. at 468-69 (noting the petitioner’s argument that “if an error is so serious
as to defy harmless-error analysis, it must also ‘affec[t] substantial rights,’” but declining to explore the issue (alteration in original)).
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Finding that constructive amendment is structural should be sufficient ground for a court to conclude that it affects substantial rights,
because structural errors by their nature undercut the reliability of a
trial. Whether or not a defendant objected to the error makes no difference in the status of the error as structural. If an error is structural,
101
it affects substantial rights, even on plain error review.
C. Current Circuit Court Views
Despite their consensus that constructive amendment is a structural
error when the defendant objects to it, the circuit courts treat constructive amendment on plain error review in four distinct ways: (1) as a
structural error, (2) as a per se prejudicial trial error, (3) as a presumptively prejudicial trial error that is subject to rebuttal, or (4) as a trial error with no special presumption. This Section surveys their approaches.
1. Structural Error in the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit is the most generous toward defendants who
did not object to constructive amendment, treating it as a structural
error that establishes per se prejudice for purposes of the third Olano
102
prong. In United States v. Floresca, the court analogized constructive
amendment to the defective reasonable-doubt instruction in Sullivan,
arguing that “it is ‘utterly meaningless’ to posit that any rational grand
jury could or would have indicted Floresca [on the indicted charge],
103
because it is plain that this grand jury did not.” Despite the Supreme
104
Court’s repudiation of the Sullivan analysis in Neder, the Fourth Cir105
cuit continues to cite the holding of Floresca with approval.
The Floresca court expressed uncertainty about whether classifying
the error as structural was sufficient to justify reversal without regard

101

If an error is not structural, it may still affect substantial rights, but the inquiry
depends on facts particular to the case rather than on the character of the error itself.
102
See United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 713 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(“[E]rror occasioned by constructive amendments . . . must affect substantial rights.”).
103
Id. at 712.
104
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s rejection
of its prior holding).
105
See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Floresca for the proposition that constructive amendment “must be corrected on appeal
even when not preserved by objection”); United States v. Mingo, 237 F. App’x. 860, 863
(4th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (same).
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for Olano, so it proceeded to the Olano analysis. The Supreme Court
later closed this question in Johnson v. United States, which explained
that the Court has “no authority” to make an exception to Rule 52,
and therefore to the application of Olano, even though the petitioner
107
No
in Johnson had argued that an error in his trial was structural.
matter how strong the case for structural error and the relationship
between structural error and the prejudice prong, a defendant must
satisfy the remaining Olano prongs as well.
The Floresca court did not rely on its argument for why the error
was structural to demonstrate that it was also prejudicial. Instead, the
court concluded that, because Stirone stated that the error affects sub108
stantial rights, constructive amendment is necessarily prejudicial
under the third prong. The court concluded that Olano does not require a showing of prejudice in every case, noting Olano’s statement
that “[t]here may be a special category of forfeited errors that can be
109
Thus, in the
corrected regardless of their effect on the outcome.”
Fourth Circuit’s view, constructive amendment is a structural error
that per se satisfies the third Olano prong.
2. Per Se Prejudice in the Second Circuit
In United States v. Thomas, the Second Circuit applied plain error
review to constructive amendment and held that the error is per se
110
prejudicial. The court, sitting en banc, stressed the importance of a
grand jury as a “buffer or referee between the Government and the
people” and noted the impropriety of speculating about what a grand
111
jury might have done if given the chance. While the court cited Stirone repeatedly, it did not rely on it as controlling precedent. The decision did not refer to the Fulminante line of cases, but its analysis is
closest to the framework approach because it isolates the indictment
106

See Floresca, 38 F.3d at 712.
See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466, 469 (1997) (holding that, even
if the structural quality of an error is relevant to whether the error affected substantial
rights, that fact does not permit a court to forego the application of Olano).
108
See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 219 (1960).
109
Floresca, 38 F.3d at 713 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993)).
110
274 F.3d 655, 666, 670 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc). The circuit has reiterated this
holding in other decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720, 729 (2d Cir.
1995) (collecting cases and observing that “[w]e repeatedly have held that constructive
amendments of an indictment are per se violations of the Fifth Amendment that require reversal even without a showing of prejudice”).
111
Thomas, 274 F.3d at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107
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as a basic feature of a trial and finds that constructive amendment is
112
per se prejudicial.
In the context of plain error review, the distinction between structural error and per se prejudice is not meaningful. One conceptual
difference is that courts correct structural errors regardless of preju113
dice, while a presumption supposes without specific proof that there
is prejudice. Consequently, while structural error could encompass
errors that are not arguably or presumptively prejudicial but that are
too important for prejudice to matter, a presumption may not be conceptually equipped to explain such errors. It is doubtful that the
structural error category embraces rights that are important but not
114
presumptively prejudicial, so there is probably no difference. More
importantly, per se prejudice and structural error produce the same
result on plain error review: definitive satisfaction of Olano’s third
115
The Fulminante approaches used by the Supreme Court to
prong.
identify structural error are more well-defined than haphazard per se
rules. If the Fulminante approaches succeed in isolating errors the effects of which are difficult to quantify, however, then the Fulminante
approaches should produce the same result as a per se rule.
Further, although the Ninth Circuit always reversed convictions
premised on constructive amendment prior to Olano, it has since expressed hesitance about the soundness of its rule following Olano,
116
which gave courts discretion to grant relief under its fourth prong.
Given its prior rule and the fact that its hesitance relates only to the
fourth prong, it seems likely that the Ninth Circuit will follow a rule
similar to the Second Circuit’s and deem the third prong satisfied.

112

See id. at 670-71.
See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735 (recognizing the possibility of “a special category of
forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of their effect on the outcome”).
114
Compare United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 (2006) (“[A]s we
have done in the past, we rest our conclusion of structural error upon the difficulty of
assessing the effect of the error.”), with id. at 159 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The touchstone of structural error is fundamental unfairness and unreliability.”). While the
Court mentions “unfairness and unreliability” with some frequency, many critics have
offered convincing evidence that the Court ignores fairness unless it relates to reliability. See supra note 34 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s harmless error and structural error jurisprudence does not consider the importance of the right at stake).
115
United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 58 (1st Cir. 2008).
116
See United States v. Dipentino, 242 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e find
it unnecessary in this case to consider whether a constructive amendment always requires reversal, even under plain error review [after Olano], because we conclude that
the defendants were prejudiced by the constructive amendment.”).
113
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3. Rebuttable Presumption of Prejudice in the Third Circuit
In United States v. Syme, the Third Circuit held that constructive
amendment warrants a rebuttable presumption of prejudice that satis117
fies the third prong of Olano.
The court noted that the grand jury
protection is “a basic right” due to its constitutional basis and that “it
is very difficult for a defendant to prove prejudice resulting from most
constructive amendments to an indictment” because a jury could have
118
convicted the defendant on any number of theories.
The court persuasively answered the concern that its ruling might
result in widespread sandbagging, that is, defendants “failing to object
to an error at the trial level in order to keep an issue for appeal as in119
surance in the event they are convicted.” Constructive amendments
are “a narrowly defined category of errors, which arise relatively infrequently” compared to variances, thereby minimizing any cause for
120
Moreover, even with the Third Circuit’s relatively generconcern.
ous rule, the discretionary fourth prong of Olano gives judges the ability to stop defendants from abusing the rule if the judges suspect
121
sandbagging.
Because the government did not rebut the presumption of prejudice, the court did not have occasion to reach the question of whether
constructive amendment is a structural error. In dicta, the court
stated that “it is doubtful that constructive amendments are structural
errors” because Supreme Court cases listing structural errors omit Sti122
rone. The court admitted that constructive amendments “are per se
123
reversible under harmless error review” and stated that, if they were
structural errors, it would “assume they would constitute per se revers124
ible error even under plain error review.” Because Johnson requires
that all errors to which the defendant did not object pass the Olano
125
test to justify reversal, the court would apparently adopt a per se rule

117

See United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 154 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will apply in
the plain error context a rebuttable presumption that constructive amendments are
prejudicial (and thus that they satisfy the third prong of plain error review).”).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 154 n.9.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 155 n.10.
123
Id. at 136.
124
Id. at 155 n.10.
125
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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of prejudice for the third Olano prong, rather than a rebuttable presumption, if constructive amendment were structural.
4. Straightforward Plain Error Analysis in Other Circuits
126

127

128

129

The First, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have all held
that constructive amendment is subject to plain error analysis and that
no presumption of prejudice, rebuttable or otherwise, applies. The
courts have used several arguments to reach this conclusion.
First, some courts presume that plain error review requires the de130
fendant to show prejudice, no matter the error involved. While this
method is simple, it holds little weight if there is any compelling justification for treating constructive amendment as structural error.
Second, the Fifth Circuit is especially concerned with the sort of sandbagging that the Third Circuit addressed in Syme, though the two protections that the Third Circuit mentioned should diminish this fear

126

See United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We . . . apply the
standard prejudice evaluation to constructive amendment claims on plain error review
and do not presume prejudice.”).
127
See United States v. Fletcher, 121 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Following
Olano . . . we have discretion to correct a Stirone error—an error that, prior to Olano,
would have required reversal per se.”), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367, 373-74 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam), as recognized
in United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 286 n.11 (5th Cir. 2004).
128
See United States v. Trennell, 290 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2002) (reviewing a defendant’s complaint that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment for
plain error because the defendant did not object to the instructions at trial); United
States v. Remsza, 77 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that, even if jury instructions constructively amended the indictment, they must be reviewed for plain error).
129
See United States v. Lawton, 995 F.2d 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (using plain error review because the defendant did not object to the constructive amendment). In
practice, the D.C. Circuit seems to protect defendants more than its sister circuits that
place the burden on the defendant. In Lawton, the court required that the defendant
prove prejudice but found the burden met because the constructive amendment made
it a “distinct possibility” that the defendant was convicted for actions that did not constitute a federal offense. Id. Lawton utilizes the same black-box argument that justifies
treating constructive amendment as structural. While nominally placing the burden of
persuasion on the defendant, the D.C. Circuit seems to require only a minimal amount
of proof: the mere possibility of an error. See id.
130
See Remsza, 77 F.3d at 1044 (stating that although Olano suggested in dicta that
some constitutional errors may be so damaging to the judicial process that no prejudice needs to be shown to correct them, constructive amendment must be prejudicial
to be reversed in the Seventh Circuit); Lawton, 995 F.2d at 294 (“Because Lawton did
not object on this ground in the district court, our review is for plain error.”).
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131

substantially.
Third, some circuits have defined constructive
amendment so broadly as to include the narrowing of the indictment.
Under such a construction, some constructive amendments do not
132
necessarily undermine reliability or fairness. While there is nothing
objectionable about this approach, it leaves open the possibility that
errors falling under the narrower definition of constructive amendment deserve special treatment. Fourth, and most persuasively, the
Supreme Court is hesitant to expand the category of structural error
so long as the most rudimentary framework of an impartial adjudica133
For every expansion of the category of
tor and counsel is present.
structural error, more cases will result in reversible error, undermining efficiency and finality. From the perspective of likely outcome,
this argument is the most persuasive, even though it fails to address
the significance of constructive amendment and the appropriate balance between error correction on one hand and efficiency and finality
on the other. In other words, the argument makes no attempt to resolve the normative question of whether constructive amendment

131

See Fletcher, 121 F.3d at 193 (declining to hold that constructive amendment requires per se reversal because, “[w]ere we to so hold, no rational defense counsel
would ever object to the erroneous instruction . . . [for] defense counsel would also
know that a conviction would necessarily be reversed on appeal”); see also supra notes
119-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s reply to the sandbagging
concern).
132
See, e.g., United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining
that its broad definition means that not all constructive amendments generate prejudice); see also Fletcher, 121 F.3d at 193 & n.6 (explaining that the defendant did not suffer prejudice when the degree of robbery on which the jury was instructed included all
of the elements on which he was indicted plus one, such that the prosecution was held
to a higher standard of proof than in the indictment, but acknowledging that this was
not “the typical case” of constructive amendment because the basis for conviction was
narrowed).
133
See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (acknowledging that structural
error applies to “a very limited class of cases” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997) (“We [have] cautioned against any
unwarranted expansion of Rule 52(b) . . . because it would skew the Rule’s careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial
the first time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
735 (1993) (“Normally, although perhaps not in every case, the defendant must make
a specific showing of prejudice . . . .”); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986) (“[I]f
the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong
presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmlesserror analysis.”); see also Brandao, 539 F.3d at 60 (observing that the Supreme Court is
“increasingly wary of recognizing new structural errors”).

10 OYER REVISED FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

638

2/1/2010 6:33 PM

[Vol. 158: 609

should be considered a structural error. Despite this fact, the category
of structural errors is, and will probably remain, small.
D. Applying the Four Fulminante Approaches
While some circuits have endeavored to apply Fulminante to assess
134
whether constructive amendment is a structural error, their analysis
suffers from the Supreme Court’s failure to provide clear guidance
about the various Fulminante approaches. This Section attempts to
supplement their analysis by applying each Fulminante approach to
constructive amendment. Constructive amendment shares many features of structural errors that the Fulminante approaches identify, but
it does not share enough features to satisfy the high standards that the
Court has set for structural error classification.
1. The Framework Approach Applied to Constructive Amendment
Floresca employed the framework approach: constructive amendment nullifies the jury verdict such that the appellate court cannot de135
termine whether the error affected the verdict.
But now that the
Supreme Court has abandoned the portion of Sullivan on which this
136
argument relies, the relationship between constructive amendment
and the framework of a trial must lie elsewhere.
Constructive amendment is centrally related to the framework of a
trial. Among the most basic features of a trial that prescribe its structure are the charges, which guide the decision about what evidence
should be presented, and the jury instructions, which dictate how the
137
jury deliberates over the charges. A constructive amendment causes
a mismatch between these basic features, upsetting the framework of
134

See supra Section II.C.
See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
136
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s retreat
from the strong rule of Sullivan).
137
The Supreme Court treats instructional errors nearly universally as trial errors.
See Neder, 527 U.S. at 9-10 (collecting cases in which the Court found instructions that
were improper to be trial error); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-07 (1991)
(listing six examples in which instructional errors are trial errors). But see Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993) (deeming defective reasonable-doubt instructions structural error). However, this fact sheds little light on the status of constructive
amendment. While constructive amendment often involves a defect with the instructions given to a jury, the difficulty is not that the instructions misstate the law but that
they do not match the indictment. The concern that constructive amendment will
undercut notice is distinct from any concerns associated with instructional errors.
135
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the trial. It is difficult to isolate a precise reason why, beyond its violation of basic procedural rights, constructive amendment is frameworkrelated. This difficulty, however, stems from the ambiguities of the
framework approach itself, not from applying the approach to con138
structive amendment.
Three counterarguments are possible. First, one might argue that
constructive amendment is not a structural error if the jury effectively
duplicates the function of the grand jury; the framework of a trial is
still intact so long as either entity has performed the relevant function.
This counterargument, however, is unlikely to succeed: First, the Supreme Court generally shies away from classifying a particular right as
“unnecessary” by focusing on whether the right’s larger purpose has
been satisfied by another means. For example, in Gonzalez-Lopez, the
Court said that the Sixth Amendment requirement of counsel of
choice “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guar139
Thus, even though a trial jury canantee of fairness be provided.”
not find a defendant guilty of an offense unless a grand jury had sufficient proof to charge the defendant with the offense, the procedural
right to a grand jury is required. Second, while this criticism’s merit
depends on an overlap between the functions of the trial jury and the
grand jury, the overlap is incomplete. Grand juries perform a distinct
function in that they provide notice to defendants of the charges
against them. A grand jury indictment also enhances clarity, thereby
curbing repeat prosecution for the same offense and appellate court
affirmations on grounds different than those upon which the jury con140
Therefore, because the right to a grand jury
victed the defendant.
indictment is independently important and serves unique functions,
there is still reason to think that constructive amendment affects the
trial framework.
A second counterargument is that a grand jury is not sufficiently
important to a fair trial to be a component of the trial framework. In
fact, the Supreme Court has not incorporated the Grand Jury Clause
141
against the states, which suggests that an accurate indictment is not
an essential, framework-level feature of a trial. Indeed, all of the other
138

See supra subsection I.A.1 (criticizing the framework approach for its inability to
differentiate procedure from framework).
139
548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006).
140
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing the important functions of the grand jury).
141
See supra note 73.
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142

structural errors affect rights that attach in state proceedings.
One
way to sidestep this criticism is to broaden the argument: a grand jury
indictment may not be essential, but a court system must provide
some advance statement of charges. This broader right to notice of
143
A criminal information could
accusations has been incorporated.
satisfy the demand for notice as well as a grand jury indictment would,
but when the federal system chooses to use grand jury indictments,
the grand jury must provide notice to the defendant of the charges
against her.
Third, whether constructive amendment affects the framework of
the trial may depend on the manner and extent to which the amendment alters the indictment. An error that affects the framework of a
144
trial only when certain facts coexist is not a structural error. For example, an amendment might broaden the basis of conviction to include behavior that is part of the same factual nexus, behavior so intimately related to the charge that the defendant believed it was part
of the indictment, or facts that she had anticipated and contested during trial. This critique highlights a difficulty with the framework approach: even the most basic error may not affect the trial framework,
depending on the facts of the case. Nonetheless, the difficulty in exceptional cases afflicts constructive amendment no more than it afflicts the archetypal structural errors. Additionally, when the error
arises on plain error review, the discretionary prong of Olano gives
courts the ability to screen out cases of constructive amendment that fit
the profile of a trial error. Consequently, this criticism should not prevent constructive amendment from being classified as a structural error.
Given the general weakness of the critiques and the critiques’ reliance on the problems with the framework approach itself, there is

142

See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968) (holding that denial
of the right to a jury trial for a serious state crime was reversible error); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (extending the right to assistance of counsel
to the states and holding that its denial constitutes reversible error); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (ruling that denial of the right to a public trial for a state crime
violated due process). Although the right to a grand jury is not incorporated, racial
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury is considered structural error because of
the broader prohibitions on discrimination applicable to the states. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986) (“[T]he criminal defendant’s right to equal protection
of the laws has been denied when he is indicted by a grand jury from which members
of a racial group purposefully have been excluded.”).
143
See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273.
144
See supra text accompanying note 37.
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good reason to classify constructive amendment as a structural error
under the framework approach.
2. The Evidentiary Approach Applied to Constructive Amendment
Under the evidentiary approach, a variance is a trial error because it
alters the depiction of a nonessential, circumstantial element of the
crime. On appeal, a judge can determine whether the error affected the
jury decision, because the error results from introduction of a particular
piece of evidence that may be weighed against the other evidence.
In contrast, there is a strong argument that constructive amendment is a structural error under the evidentiary approach. The Third
Circuit’s argument in Syme is apt: because a jury may convict on a variety of theories, proving that constructive amendment is prejudicial is
typically “very difficult” because no one outside the jury is certain
145
about whether the error influenced the jury’s decision. A jury might
convict for the reason specified in the indictment, but it might also
convict based on the broader scope of evidence or the erroneously
provided instruction. Because the jury may have convicted on an improper basis, a reviewing court cannot weigh the error against other
evidence without supplanting the role of the jury. The difficulty of
knowing the content of jury deliberations thus shows why the evidentiary approach provides the strongest case for classifying constructive
amendment as a structural error.
One hurdle for this argument is that, in rare cases, the error is
weighable. For example, when a jury delivers a special verdict that
clarifies its theory of why the defendant is guilty, the verdict removes
146
Given the Neder arany ambiguity about the reason for conviction.
gument that an error is structural based on its necessary qualities, not
147
its contingent qualities, this counterargument may be a reason that
constructive amendment is not a structural error. However, constructive amendment raises this issue in a distinct context because the error

145

United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 154 (3d Cir. 2002). See generally FED. R.
EVID. 606(b) (forbidding inquiry into jury deliberations).
146
See, e.g., United States v. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 2002)
(finding no constructive amendment where a defendant was charged with possessing a
“firearm with ammunition” under a statute criminalizing possession of a “firearm or ammunition,” as the special verdict form revealed unanimity on possession of a firearm).
147
See supra notes 37, 144, and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s stance
in Neder). But see infra text accompanying note 151 (discussing how the Court softened
the strict requirements of Neder in Gonzalez-Lopez).
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is necessarily unfair and incapable of being weighed against other evidence unless certain contingent facts exist. Again, on plain error review, the discretionary prong of Olano enables courts to refuse to provide relief if extraordinary facts make the jury’s deliberative process
clear. Absent a special verdict, the evidentiary approach cuts in favor
of treating the error as structural.
3. The Timing Approach Applied to Constructive Amendment
Whether constructive amendment is a structural error under the
timing approach depends on how the error is framed. The error of
omission from the indictment occurs prior to the presentation of the
case to the jury, implying that the error is structural. The error of
commission occurs during the presentation of evidence or instructions to the jury. While there is room for debate over what counts as
“presentation to the jury,” instructing the jury almost certainly falls in
that category, indicating that it is trial error. Thus, the result of the
148
timing approach hinges on which frame of view is most accurate.
The error of commission frame of view is preferable because, in a
case of constructive amendment, the indictment is not erroneous. Rather, it is the subsequent deviation from the indictment that constitutes an error. Although constructive amendment is possible only by
reference to the earlier indictment, there would be no error if the earlier indictment were followed precisely. As a result, the error occurs
during the presentation of the case to the jury. This fact fatally undercuts the contention that constructive amendment is a structural error under the timing approach. Nevertheless, it may not completely
defeat a claim of structural error given that the Supreme Court has
classified a jury instruction as a structural error when it fit the struc149
tural error profile under other approaches.

148

It is conceivable that the error could consist of two actions that take place at
different times. But if both frames of view are equally plausible, then this approach
would catalog the error as both trial and structural, which is nonsensical under the
Fulminante dichotomy. Therefore, I assume that one view must be more accurate and
that the more accurate view determines the outcome of the timing approach.
149
See supra text accompanying notes 45-48 (discussing the retreat from Sullivan
and the timing approach).
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4. The Reliability Approach Applied to Constructive Amendment
Constructive amendment undercuts the reliability of a trial in two
ways that are closely connected to the functions of the grand jury.
First, the absence of a grand jury screening the government’s charges
might undermine the reliability of the trial jury’s decision of guilt.
Despite the jury’s verdict of guilt, a court should not assume that the
150
grand jury would have issued an indictment. Even if a grand jury is
not especially effective at enhancing the reliability of the verdict because of its lower standard of proof, it still has some purpose in providing citizen input into the government’s decision to prosecute,
which can enhance reliability through social consensus.
Second, a defendant who does not have notice of the bases for her
charge is prone to present a less adequate defense, which in turn
renders the adversarial system a less reliable producer of accurate determinations of guilt. While a defendant might eventually be put on
notice when the government presents evidence beyond the scope of
the indictment or when the judge instructs the jury, such notice is inadequate because the defendant might not have time to prepare an effective rebuttal. Thus, constructive amendment undermines reliability.
*

*

*

Treating constructive amendment as structural error is sensible
under all approaches except the timing approach. The best method
by which to advocate for structural error classification is employment of
the Gonzalez-Lopez language that rejects the view that “only those errors
that always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and unreli151
able are structural.”
This method bypasses some of the difficulties
arising from the rare but possible instances in which the typical problems with constructive amendment do not apply. Highlighting the approaches under which constructive amendment seems most akin to

150

Cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (declining to engage in “speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe”
where a defendant was not deprived of counsel). The type of speculative inquiry that
Gonzalez-Lopez disclaimed is analogous to imagining that a grand jury would have
reached the same result as a jury in the trial itself. Moreover, the existence of overlap
between procedural protections that enhance reliability is no reason to dispense with
one protection.
151
Id. at 149 n.4.
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a structural error could suffice, depending on which approaches the
Court wishes to emphasize.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is reluctant to expand the cate152
gory of structural error, and it consistently excludes Stirone from the
153
list of past structural errors. Consequently, it seems improbable that
the Court will classify constructive amendment as a structural error.
E. Benefits of Using a Rebuttable Presumption of Prejudice
Because the Court will probably not hold that constructive
amendment is a structural error, it will remain difficult for defendants
to prove prejudice from a constructive amendment. When a defendant has preserved her objection, the harmless error doctrine already
places the burden on the government to show that the error was not
154
harmless, thus functioning as a rebuttable presumption that the error was prejudicial. Giving the government the burden of proof is an
effective way to protect defendants in the face of the unknowns that
typically accompany constructive amendment.
Correspondingly,
when defendants fail to properly object to a constructive amendment,
courts should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the third Olano
prong is satisfied, as the Third Circuit has done. This Section explains
the merits and function of a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.
A rebuttal presumption of prejudice for the third prong of Olano
is not unprecedented, even outside the Third Circuit. Olano left open
155
the possibility of a rebuttable prejudice standard, although later cases have not considered the applicability of rebuttable prejudice after
156
Some circuits employ prefinding that an error is nonstructural.
sumptions of prejudice in other contexts in which proving prejudice is
uniquely difficult, including cases on appeal at the time United States v.
157
Booker made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory and cases in
152

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
154
See United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining
the difference between plain error and harmless error review).
155
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993) (leaving room for, but not
addressing, “a special category of forfeited errors that can be corrected regardless of
their effect on the outcome”—i.e., structural errors—in addition to “those errors that
should be presumed prejudicial if the defendant cannot make a specific showing of
prejudice”).
156
See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1999).
157
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(“[W]here mandatory sentencing was governed by an erroneous scheme[,] prejudice
153
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which a district court violates a defendant’s right of allocution and
there is “any possibility” that, but for the error, the defendant would
158
have received a lesser sentence. When alternate jurors participate in
deliberations, some courts allow the possibility of prejudice to satisfy
159
the appellant’s burden of persuasion on the issue of prejudice,
which functions in the same way as a presumption of prejudice.
A presumption of prejudice is appropriate for cases of constructive amendment that arise on plain error review. Without access to
the black box of the jury, it is impossible to know whether a jury convicted a defendant on the narrow basis of the indicted charge or on
the erroneously broadened basis. Under a traditional plain error approach, the insurmountable burden of proving prejudice rests with
the defense. Courts should take the middle ground by treating constructive amendment as presumptively prejudicial. In cases where
there is determinably no prejudice, the government will easily rebut
the presumption. For example, the government could point to a special verdict form refuting the defendant’s claim that she was convicted
of an uncharged offense. The government might also rebut the presumptive prejudice in cases in which the defendant must have been
on notice—e.g., cases in which the amendment is intimately connected to the charged conduct, the amendment is based on the same

can be presumed.”); United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a presumption of prejudice was appropriate because proving prejudice
would require complex speculation about the court’s behavior). Other circuits have
adopted different approaches. See Deborah S. Nall, Comment, United States v. Booker: The Presumption of Prejudice in Plain Error Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 621, 635-37
(2006) (explicating three broad approaches to dealing with direct review of Booker error). See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265-67 (2005) (holding that
the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment).
158
United States v. Luepke, 495 F.3d 443, 451 (7th Cir. 2007); accord United States
v. Reyna, 358 F.3d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (presuming prejudice when the
defendant’s right to allocution was violated); United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 287
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e should presume prejudice when a defendant shows a violation
of the right and the opportunity for such a violation to have played a role in the . . .
sentencing decision.”).
159
See, e.g., Manning v. Huffman, 269 F.3d 720, 725 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[S]trict
evidentiary prohibitions against inquiring into the mental processes of the jury would
make it almost impossible for a defendant to show that an alternate juror in fact prejudiced his case.”); cf. United States v. Acevedo, 141 F.3d 1421, 1424 (11th Cir. 1998) (assuming that the presence of alternates during deliberations prejudiced the jury because the judge instructed them to participate and even allowed one to become the
foreman); United States v. Ottersburg, 76 F.3d 137, 139-40 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
prejudice because the alternates presumptively followed the judge’s instruction to deliberate with the jury).
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factual nexus as the charged conduct, and the defendant deployed a
well-researched defense on the issue. The opportunity for rebuttal
ensures that exceptional cases—cases where constructive amendment
was not problematic—do not result in a windfall to the defendant.
Olano’s discretionary prong provides an additional safeguard to en160
At the same time, the presumption effectively
sure just outcomes.
compensates for the difficulty of proof by resolving the ambiguity in
favor of the defendant, a result that is especially appropriate for a constitutional-level error.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not provided a unified framework for analyzing which errors are amenable to harmless error analysis. Fulminante
purports to accomplish this objective, but it is subject to four competing
interpretations. Although a family-resemblance treatment of the Fulminante approaches captures the salient features of each method, taken
together they have no logical structure and provide little guidance for
lower courts. Until the Supreme Court replaces Fulminante with a more
fine-grained means of assessing the applicability of harmless error analysis, courts that confront constructive amendment on plain error review
should presume, subject to rebuttal, that the error affected substantial
rights. Even when the defendant does not object to the error, it is unfair to make her prove the unknown content of jury deliberations to
protect her constitutional right to notice of the charges against her. A
rebuttable presumption that constructive amendment affects substantial rights accommodates the similarities of constructive amendment
and recognized structural errors—particularly the difficulty of proving
prejudice—while affording courts the flexibility to not reverse on the
basis of an error that, in light of the circumstances, is insignificant.

160

Cf. United States v. Noel, No. 07-2468, 2009 WL 2835428, at *18 (7th Cir. Sept.
4, 2009) (Williams, J., dissenting) (“Shifting [the] burdens of proof alone does not disrupt the Supreme Court’s attempts to limit the expansion of structural errors.”).

